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"[...] The sharp increases and extreme volatility of oil prices have led observers to suggest that some
part of the rise in prices reects a speculative component arising from the activities of traders in the
oil markets."  Ben S. Bernanke (2004)1
1 Introduction
The long-standing debate regarding the sources of oil price uctuations recently intensied due to the dramatic
rise in oil prices. Kilian (2009) highlights that oil price shocks can have very di¤erent e¤ects on the real price of
oil depending on the origin of the shock. He concludes that oil prices have historically been driven by demand
factors. Since this contribution, an impressive list of empirical studies have investigated the e¤ects of di¤erent
types of oil shocks, agreeing with Kilians (2009) conclusion.2
While this nding has gained strong support, the developments in the oil market in the past ten years have
been so dramatic that they took many market participants by surprise. In fact, some of them have suggested
that the recent run-up in oil prices has not been driven by supply and demand.3 Tang and Xiong (2012) argue
that a speculative component may be behind the recent boom in commodity prices. This idea has fueled an
ongoing debate on imposing additional regulatory limits on trading in oil futures (see Masters, 2008), making
the link between speculation and oil prices relevant from a policy standpoint.
One striking characteristic of the oil market over the past decade is that large nancial institutions, hedge
funds, and other investment funds have invested billions of dollars in the futures market to take advantage of oil
price changes. Evidence suggests that commodities have become a recognized asset class within the investment
portfolios of nancial institutions as a means to diversify risks such as ination or equity market weakness (see
Geman, 2005; and Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006). It is estimated that assets allocated to commodity index
trading strategies rose from $13 billion in 2004 to $260 billion as of March 2008. This increased volume of
trading had a number of e¤ects on commodity markets. According to Hamilton and Wu (2011), it changed
the nature of risk premia in the crude oil futures market. In particular, the compensation to the long position
became smaller on average but more volatile. Tang and Xiong (2012) note that the growing ow of investment
to commodity markets coincided with an increase in the price of oil and a higher price comovement between
di¤erent commodities.
We analyze whether speculation in the oil market was a driver of this empirical pattern. To this end, we
assess the role of supply, global demand, oil inventory demand and speculative shocks as drivers of oil prices.
Shocks are identied by imposing economically meaningful sign restrictions on the impulse responses of a subset
of variables. Supply shocks refer to changes in the current physical availability of crude oil (see Hamilton, 1985,
2003; Kilian, 2008a, b). Global demand shocks reect an increase in demand for all industrial commodities
triggered by the state of the global business cycle. An oil inventory demand shock arises from the possibility of
a sudden shortage in future production or expectations of higher demand in the future. This shock represents a
shift of the demand curve along an upward sloping supply curve as a consequence of an increase in the demand
for inventories.
1From "Oil and the Economy," remarks by then-Governor Bernanke delivered at the Distinguished Lecture Series, Darton Col-
lege, Albary, Georgia, on October 21, 2004 (available at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20041021/default.htm).
2See, among others, Baumeister and Peersman (2010), Kilian and Murphy (2011a, b), Kilian and Park (2009), Lombardi and
Van Robays (2011), and Peersman and Van Robays (2009, 2010).
3This idea can be found in a 2006 interview of Lord Browne, Group Chief Executive of British Petroleoum, as reported
in "The Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: A Need to Put the Cop Back on the Beat," Permanent
Subcommitee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental A¤airs, United States Senate, (available
at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SenatePrint10965MarketSpecReportFINAL.pdf?attempt=2). We note that this
report also contains testimonies from other CEOs along the same lines.
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Speculative shocks have attracted a great deal of attention in the literature, fueled by the oil market
developments in the past decade. Our identication of this shock is inspired by Hamilton (2009a), where
he describes a channel through which speculation can impact the physical side of the market. In particular,
he illustrates how speculators can a¤ect the incentives faced by producers by purchasing a large number of
futures contracts and signalling higher expected spot prices. Producers, revising their expectations for the
price of oil for future delivery, will hold oil back from the market and accumulate inventories. As explained by
Hotellings (1931) principle, it would benet oil producers to forgo current production so they can sell oil at
higher future prices. As Hamilton (2009a) describes, we could think that oil market participants were misled
by the speculative purchases of oil futures contracts into reducing current production in response.4 Although
this last type of shock may not be directly linked to fundamentals, because it a¤ects future spot prices it
inuences the current behavior of oil market participants, modifying the incentives to accumulate (above and
below ground) inventories. In fact, this shock represents a contemporaneous shift in the demand for above and
below ground inventories.5
In terms of methodology, we re-examine the role of speculation relative to supply and demand forces as
drivers of oil prices using a dynamic factor model (DFM). Bernanke et al. (2005) and Giannone et al. (2005)
argue that the small number of variables in a vector autoregression (VAR) may not span the information sets
used by market participants, who are known to follow hundreds of data series. We provide evidence that the
small-scale VARs for the oil market, typically used in the literature, are not informationally su¢ cient to identify
the shocks. Therefore, we use a set of factors to summarize the bulk of aggregate uctuations of a large dataset,
which includes both macroeconomic and nancial variables of the G7 countries and a rich set of commodity
prices. We show that the information set plays an important role: (i) The shape of the impulse responses is
di¤erent in the VAR compared to the DFM; and (ii) The DFM suggests that although global demand shocks
account for the largest share of oil price uctuations, their contribution is smaller than in VAR estimates.
In addition, our results also show that speculative shocks are the second most important driver of oil price
dynamics.
Interpreting oil price uctuations over the past decade under the lens of our model reveals that speculative
shocks began to play a relevant role as drivers of oil price increases in 2004. Interestingly, this timing is
consistent with other studies documenting the increase in investment ows into commodity markets in 2004
(see Singleton, 2011; and Tang and Xiong, 2012), as well as with the anecdotal evidence presented in Masters
(2008). Although speculation played a signicant role in driving oil price increases between 2004 and 2008, and
their subsequent decline, the increase in oil prices over the last decade is due mainly to the strength of global
demand, in line with Kilian (2009), and most of the literature thereafter.
The use of a DFM allows us to investigate the transmission of oil shocks to a large number of variables.
Therefore, we can analyze the correlations between oil prices and the price of other commodities in response to
each shock. We nd that global demand shocks are the main drivers of the comovement between commodity
prices, consistent with the narrative in Kilian (2009). However, the speculative shock is also associated with a
positive comovement between oil and the price of other commodities, even though it is smaller in magnitude
4The description of the speculative shock is motivated by the recent trend of investment in commodity markets. However, the
same response on the producers side can arise in the absence of futures markets. This will happen if the oil price is expected to
increase relative to production costs and current production is reduced as producers withhold some energy resources to sell at a
greater prot at a future date. Davidson et al. (1974) nd evidence supporting the existence of speculative activity before futures
markets were developed. The presence of futures markets may strengthen the role of shocks to the expectation of future oil prices,
but clearly the concept of speculation that we identify is a general one. See online appendix for further details.
5 In the presence of higher expected prices, we should expect an increase in the demand for inventories, as well as a reduction of
oil supply (i.e., increase in the demand for below ground inventories). See Appendix B for more details.
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than the correlation given by global demand shocks. This is consistent with the results of Tang and Xiong
(2012) and suggests that the speculative shock that we identify is picking up the e¤ects of nancialization
driven by the rapid growth of commodity index investment as emphasized by Singleton (2011), among others.
The correlation between oil prices and the prices of other commodities is negative for supply and oil inventory
demand shocks, implying that they cannot be responsible for the comovement in commodity prices.
Our paper is related to a strand of the literature that studies the e¤ects of speculation on the oil spot price
using data on traderspositions in the futures market (see, e.g., Haigh et al., 2007; Büyüksahin et al., 2008;
and Büyüksahin and Harris, 2011). These studies nd mixed evidence on the role of nancial activity in oil
spot prices. Our study o¤ers a complementary approach. We nd evidence consistent with the fact that the
main determinant of oil price uctuations is global demand. Therefore, our results provide additional support
to the demand driven explanations of the recent developments in the oil market. Nevertheless, we show that
speculative shocks are also relevant. This suggests that speculative activities can alter the incentives faced by
operators in the oil market since they a¤ect the expectation formation of market participants .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric method. Section 3
describes the data and the identication strategy. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and Section 5 o¤ers
some concluding remarks.
2 Econometric Method
Since Kilian (2009) a large body of literature has focused on disentangling the determinants of oil price uctua-
tions using structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) on a small set of variables. In this framework, structural
shocks are identied as a linear combination of the residuals of the linear projection of a low-dimensional vector
of variables into their lagged values. This implies that all the relevant information for the identication of the
shocks is included in the small set of variables in the VAR that is, that the identied structure of the shocks
is fundamental (see Hansen and Sargent, 1991; Lippi and Reichlin, 1993, 1994; and Fernandez-Villaverde et
al., 2007).6 However, additional information available in other economic series excluded from the VAR may be
relevant to the dynamic relation implied in the VAR model. Excluding this information can have implications
for the estimated model. In particular, the identication of the shocks and their related transmission mechanism
can be severely biased by the omission of relevant information. One way to address this issue is to augment the
information set of the VAR by including a small set of factors that summarize the information from a wider set
of variables (see Forni et al., 2009). In this section, we provide a summary of the DFM approach that we use
in the empirical section.
Let xit denote a generic variable of a panel of N stationary time series, where both the N and T dimensions
are very large. In a factor model, each variable in our dataset, xit, is expressed as the sum of a common
component and an idiosyncratic component that are mutually orthogonal and unobservable:
xit = ift + it; (1)
where ft represents r unobserved factors and r is much smaller than N , i is the r-dimensional vector of factor
loadings, and it are idiosyncratic components of xit uncorrelated with ft. The idiosyncratic components are
weakly correlated across the cross-sectional dimension. We can consider them as shocks that a¤ect a single
variable or a small group of variables. For example, in the specic dataset under analysis the idiosyncratic
components will incorporate shocks to a single country that are not large enough to a¤ect all other countries.
6For a review about fundamentalness in VAR models see Alessi et al. (2011).
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The idiosyncratic components also include a measurement error that is uncorrelated across variables. Allowing
for a measurement error is particularly useful in our context. As an example, low-dimensional VARs typically
used to analyze the oil market include some proxy for global demand. However, any observable measure of
this general concept is likely to be contaminated by measurement errors. As Bernanke et al. (2005) describe,
the concept of "economic activity" may not be accurately represented by an observable measure. A similar
argument is also made in Giannone et al. (2005).
As for the oil market variables, let yt denote the 3  1 vector including the change in oil production, the
change in the real oil price and the change in oil inventories. We assume that these variables can be decomposed
into a common (foilt ) and idiosyncratic (
oil






This specication ensures that most of the dynamics of the oil variables is picked up by "specialized" common
factors, so that we can safely identify the structural shocks from the innovation to the transition equation for
the factors, as discussed below.7
The last block of the model consists of the transition equation for the dynamics of the unobservable factors.










where (L) is the lag polynomial in the lag operator L, and ut is the error term with mean zero and (an
unrestricted) variance-covariance matrix . Note that the block diagonal restriction on the loadings of the
measurement equations, (1)-(2), ensures that the oil factors capture a large part of the variation in the oil
variables, yet the specication for the transition equation ensures that the oil factors can still be inuenced by
the other factors (and vice versa). In the empirical section we also impose the restriction that oil prices are
measured without error.8 With these restrictions, our model is a special case of DFM, which nests the Factor
Augmented VAR (FAVAR), allowing for measurement error in oil production and oil inventories.
Kilian (2009) highlights the importance of global demand forces in the determination of oil prices. In fact,
after his contribution all the low dimensional VARs of the oil market always include a proxy for global economic
activity among the relevant variables for identifying the structural shocks. In a way, the low-dimensional VARs
can be considered a specic version of (3), where the proxy for global economic activity is considered to be
a single observable factor. In this respect, we complement the existing empirical evidence by allowing the
stochastic dimension of the large dataset of macroeconomic and nancial variables (i.e., the world economy) to
be larger than 1. This will be true whenever the global economy is a¤ected by more than one source of common
shocks.9 Therefore, specication (3) highlights that the low-dimensional VARs will not be able to identify the
structural shocks whenever they fail to incorporate all the relevant information embodied in the factors.10 In
7We restrict the factor loadings to be the identity matrix. This assumption is not restrictive, as we can always rotate the factors,
yet it has the advantage of allowing us to interpret each of the factors as the signal embodied in each of the variables. Therefore,
the idiosyncratic component can be thought of as the noise or measurement error in the oil variables.
8This restriction implies that (controlling for the identied shocks) oil prices are insensitive to non-global shocks or measurement
errors in the oil variables. This assumption is justied by the highly integrated global market for oil and its derivatives. A similar
approach has been pursued by Luciani (2012) in a di¤erent context. Note that the results are qualitatively similar if we were to
include an idiosyncratic component in oil prices. The results from this estimation are not presented here to preserve space but are
available upon request.
9This is a realistic assumption that holds even if one is not willing to postulate the presence of global shocks. Indeed, the
presence of interconnections among economies in the global markets gives rise to a factor representation of the data akin to (1)
(see, e.g., Chudick et al., 2011).
10This condition can be easily veried by looking at a Granger causality test of the low-dimensional VAR with respect to the
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addition, allowing for measurement error in oil production and oil inventory data allows us to deal with the
di¢ culty of constructing precise measures of these variables (see, e.g., Kilian and Lee, 2013).







 N (0;R) ; where R is a diagonal matrix, Doz et al. (2012) show that
it can be consistently estimated by (Quasi) Maximum Likelihood under di¤erent sources of misspecication of
the cross-sectional and serial correlation of the idiosyncratic components. Since the factors are unobserved, the
maximum likelihood estimators of the parameters of model, f;R;;g, are generally not available in closed
form. In addition, direct maximization of the likelihood is computationally demanding due to the large number
of parameters. Therefore, we adopt the EM algorithm described in Banbura and Modugno (2012), which also
allows us to handle the unbalancedness of the data.11
We are interested in analyzing the impact of di¤erent types of oil shocks within the framework of a DFM.
To give a structural interpretation to the shocks we follow the approach based on sign restrictions proposed by
Canova and De Nicoló (2002) and Uhlig (2005). We identify the shocks by imposing economically meaningful
sign restrictions on the impulse responses of a subset of variables. Specically, let Q denote an orthonormal
matrix such that Q0Q = I. The structural shocks can be recovered as t = Qut. The orthonormal matrices Q
are found from the eigenvalue decomposition of a random q q matrix (where q = 3+ r) drawn from a normal
distribution with unitary variance (see Rubio-Ramirez et al., 2010). The corresponding structural impulse
response function to the common component for the oil variables can be recovered as
yt = [I3;03r] [I3+r (L)L] 1 Q0t;
where the moving average representation of the ith variable in the dataset can be written as
xit = [013;i] [I3+r (L)L] 1 Q0t:
To account for estimation uncertainty, we adopt a non-overlapping block bootstrap technique. We partition
the T  (N + 3) matrix of data Z = [yit xit] 8i; t into S sub-matrices Zs (blocks), s = 1; :::; S; of dimension
  (N + 3), where  is an integer part of T=S: In the empirical Section we set  = 20 (equivalent to ve
year blocks). An integer hs between 1 and S is drawn randomly with reintroduction S times to obtain the






of dimension S  (N + 3) and
the corresponding impulse responses are estimated.
3 Data and Identication
3.1 Data
The estimation period runs from the second quarter of 1972 to the end of 2009. The dataset consists of 151
series which includes macroeconomic and nancial variables of the G7 countries as well as oil market data,
measures of global economic activity and a rich set of commodity prices. Appendix A provides a complete
description of the data and sources.
information summarized by the factors (see Giannone and Reichlin, 2006). We describe this test in Section 4 and report further
details in Appendix C.
11We initialize the algorithm using the estimates from a FAVAR model, where the oil variables are assumed to be measured
without error and a number of principal components are estimated from the balanced part of the dataset (following Stock and
Watson, 2002). When it comes to the variance of the idiosyncratic components of the oil variables, which the FAVAR assumes to
be equal to 0; we initialize it to be a small number, . The results are not a¤ected by the particular choice of .
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The set of macroeconomic and nancial variables includes output, prices, labor market indicators, the trade
balance, interest rates, stock market price indices as well as exchange rates and is sourced from the Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
The real oil price is the average oil price taken from the IFS deated by the U.S. CPI. World oil production
is obtained from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Given the lack of data on crude oil inventories for other
countries, we follow Kilian and Murphy (2011a) in using the data for total U.S. crude oil inventories provided
by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), scaled by the ratio of OECD petroleum stocks over U.S.
petroleum stocks.12 The price of other commodities is from the IFS and considered in real terms after being
deated by the U.S. CPI. Two proxies of global economic activity are also included in the dataset. The rst
one is an IFS index of aggregate industrial production and the second is the measure of global real economic
activity based on data for dry cargo bulk freight rates as proposed by Kilian (2009).13
3.2 Identication
We identify oil supply, global demand, oil inventory demand, and speculative shocks using the sign restrictions
summarized in Table 1. The rst three shocks have been the focus of the recent literature and their identication
builds on Baumeister and Peersman (2011) and Kilian and Murphy (2011a, b). The identication of the
speculative shock is inspired by Hamilton (2009a). In what follows we describe the identication of each shock
in detail.
[Table 1 about here]
An oil supply shock is dened as any unanticipated shift in the oil supply curve that results in an opposite
movement of oil production and the real price of crude oil. During an oil supply disruption inventories are
depleted in an e¤ort to smooth oil production and real activity contracts.
An oil inventory demand shock arises from the possibility of a sudden shortage in future production or
expectations of higher demand in the future. A similar situation can occur in the presence of uncertainty about
future oil supplies, driven, for example, by political instability in key oil-producing countries such as Nigeria,
Iraq, Venezuela, or Libya. A positive oil inventory demand shock raises demand for inventories, leading to an
increase in the level of inventories and real oil prices. Inventories of crude oil increase so that supply can meet
demand in the event of supply shortfalls or unexpected shifts in demand (see Alquist and Kilian, 2010). The
increase in the real price of oil provides an incentive for oil producers to increase production and also leads to
a decline in real activity.14
A global demand shock is driven by unexpected changes in global economic activity. This represents shifts
in demand for all industrial commodities (including oil) resulting from higher real economic activity, triggered,
for example, by rapid growth in China, India, and other emerging economies (see Kilian and Hicks, 2009). This
increase in the demand for oil will drive up its real price while oil production increases to satisfy the higher
12Petroleum stocks sourced from the EIA include crude oil (including strategic reserves) as well as unnished oils, natural gas
plant liquids, and rened products. Following Kilian and Murphy (2011a) we treat the OECD data as a proxy for global petroleum
inventories given that the EIA does not report data for non-OECD economies. Since consistent series for OECD petroleum stocks
are not available prior to 1987.4, we follow Kilian and Murphy (2011a) and extrapolate the percent change in OECD inventories
backwards at the rate of growth of U.S. petroleum inventories.
13This measure is available from Lutz Kilians website at monthly frequency. We use the last month of each quarter to obtain
the quarterly index.
14Kilian and Murphy (2011a) refer to this shock as "speculative demand shock," and dene it as "a shock to the demand of
above ground oil inventories arising from forward looking behavior" (Kilian and Murphy, 2011a).
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demand. In turn, the e¤ect on oil inventories is ambiguous. In addition to the sign restrictions, we follow
Kilian and Murphy (2011b) and impose an upper bound of 0.0257 for the response of the impact elasticity of
oil supply with respect to the real price jointly after both demand shocks. The results are robust to the use of
di¤erent elasticity bounds.
3.2.1 Identication of Speculative Shocks
We identify a speculative shock inspired by Hamilton (2009a), where he discusses how the "nancialization" of
the oil market may play a role in the determination of oil prices (along the lines of Masters, 2008). In particular,
he explains how the role of speculative activities can be reconciled with what happens in the physical side of
the oil market. Hamilton (2009a) describes the possibility that nancial speculation, by a¤ecting the expected
future spot prices (Et [Pt+1]), can change the incentives faced by producers, and therefore have an impact on
the supply side of the market.
Speculation can be dened as the purchase of commodities (either in physical form or nancial contracts)
in anticipation of a nancial gain at the time of the resale (see Frankel and Rose, 2010). For example, a typical
investment strategy for commodity traders consists of taking a long-position in a futures contract at price Ft,
selling it before it expires at the higher price Pt+1 and using the proceeds to take a long position in another
futures contract. If the expectations are such that the expected future spot price Et [Pt+1] is higher than the
futures price Ft (Et [Pt+1] > Ft), more investment funds will take long positions in futures contracts. As the
number of buys of futures contracts exceeds the number of sells of expiring ones, futures prices go up and with
them the expected spot price.15 In the physical side of the market, as producers expect a higher price of oil for
future delivery (Et [Pt+1]), they will hold oil back from the market and accumulate inventories. Leaving more
oil underground may enhance total prots on the producersinvestment given that prices are expected to rise
in the future (more rapidly than the average market return). As explained by Hotellings (1931) principle, it
would benet oil producers to forgo current production so they can sell the oil at higher future prices. In this
way, oil producers will not accommodate the upward trend in oil prices but rather decrease production (see
also Jovanovic, 2007). As Hamilton (2009a) describes, we could think that oil-producing countries were misled
by the speculative purchases of oil futures contracts into reducing current production.16
Oil producers take future prots into account when deciding whether to produce today or tomorrow, espe-
cially in the context of speculation, when prices are expected to increase in the future. In contrast to an oil
inventory demand shock, speculative shocks lead to inventory accumulation not because of a fear of production
shortage (which would generate a need for oil storage), but because speculation itself leads to higher expected
prices. The reduction in the oil available for current use, resulting from lower production and increased (below
ground) inventory holding, causes the current spot oil price to rise. The same type of incentives can lead to
an increase in the storage of above ground inventories.17 A summary of the sign restrictions consistent with
15 Ignoring the e¤ect of risk premia, arbitrage would be such that Et [Pt+1] = (1 + rt)Ft. In this discussion we are implicitly
holding the real interest rate xed.
16The equilibrium in the physical side of the market implies that inventories accumulate whenever production (Qt) exceeds
current consumption (Xt), i.e., It+1   It = Qt  Xt. Therefore, when imposing our sign restriction for the speculative shock we
are implicitly assuming that the price elasticity of production is smaller than the price elasticity of consumption (i.e., the shift in
supply is large enough to counteract the e¤ect of the shift in demand. See Appendix B for more details).
17Let us illustrate this with a simple example. Assume the existence of a NYMEX futures contract that consists of delivering
1,000 barrels of light sweet crude oil in one month to a buyer at Cushing, Oklahoma. The link between futures price and the cash
price at Cushing can be described as follows. A producer of crude oil is o¤ered $80 per barrel for 1,000 barrels of oil today. The
same producer sees that the futures contract for delivery next month is trading at $85 dollars. Instead of selling at $80 to the
rener today, the producer could sell a futures contract for delivery next month at $85, store the 1,000 barrels for a month and be
$5000 better o¤ less the cost of a month storage. The rener needing the 1,000 barrels of crude today is then in the position that he
must o¤er the producer something closer to the $85 NYMEX price to obtain the crude oil. This implies that producers themselves
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this narrative and used to identify the speculative shock is presented in the last row of Table 1. The intuition
behind these restrictions can be found in a simple model presented in Appendix B.
Note that we do not impose a sign restriction on the response of real economic activity as there are two
forces that operate in opposite directions. The oil price increase would in principle have a contractionary
e¤ect on demand. However, we are not comfortable imposing such a restriction because we do not want to
rule out alternative transmission channels. One of them refers to the possibility that the increase in nancial
speculation is triggered by low real interest rates, as suggested by Frankel (1986 and 2008). As he explains,
lower real rates reduce the cost of "carry trade" in the commodity markets, amplifying the e¤ect of a mismatch
between expected future spot prices and futures prices. In the physical side of the market, real rates represent
the opportunity cost of holding inventories both above and below ground. This channel is consistent with
our identifying restrictions and would imply a positive e¤ect on real activity (see Frankel and Rose, 2010).
The other channel is emphasized in Sockin and Xiong (2013), who propose a model in which an increase in
commodity futures prices driven by non-fundamental factors may induce agents with imperfect information to
believe this as a signal of strong global economic growth, and may therefore be associated with an increase in
economic activity.
The perspective on speculation that we describe in this Section is referred to as speculation by oil producers
in Kilian and Murphy (2011a). In fact, this is one of the components of their supply shock, which we can
disentangle from the standard supply shock only by imposing the additional negative restriction on oil inventories
following an oil supply shock. Specically, this restriction imposes a production-smoothing rationale for holding
inventories in the presence of supply shocks. Kilian and Murphy (2011a) report evidence supporting this type
of inventory behavior, so this restriction seems reasonable.18 In contrast to our identication strategy, Kilian
and Murphy (2011a) identify a speculative shock in which oil inventories increase, oil prices go up, and oil
production increases. This is what we refer to as oil inventory demand shocks, which essentially represents a
shift of the demand of inventories along an upward sloping supply curve. Appendix B presents a simple model
that justies the restrictions for the oil inventory and speculative shocks.
The role of speculation in driving oil prices has been very active in the policy debate. In this regard, it is
interesting to note that the set of sign restrictions that we use for identication are consistent with Bernanke
(2004) description on how speculative activities can a¤ect oil prices. The online appendix summarizes his
perspective.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 The Role of the Information Set: VAR and DFM with 3 Shocks
As a rst step we evaluate whether our large dataset contains valuable information with respect to a small-scale
VAR typically used in the literature to characterize the e¤ects of oil shocks by implementing the procedure
introduced by Giannone and Reichlin (2006) and discussed in Forni and Gambetti (2011). The test results
may end up holding a higher level of above ground inventories. Notice that if the reners also share the expectations of higher
future prices, they would want to increase their holding of inventories too. This allows them to cover for higher expected input
prices and to increase their future share of revenues. We implicitly assume that the market is not completely vertically integrated.
If it was, we would not observe a change in above ground inventories.
18Note that the sign restrictions imposed to identify the speculative shock could be consistent with a supply disruption in which
consumers expect the disruption to get worst and therefore inventory accumulation increases. This would be consistent with a
deliberate decision by oil producers to reduce current oil production (see, e.g., Hamilton, 2009b, p.188). However, this type of "oil
supply" shock would manifest in a persistent upward trend in the oil price. This is at odds with the results that we will present in
Section 4.2.3.
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imply that a small-scale VAR is not informationally su¢ cient to identify the shocks and suggest that 4 factors
are added to the VAR (the test is presented in Appendix C).19
In what follows, we estimate two VARs and a DFM with the three shocks typically identied in the literature
and compare their results. The two 4-variable VARs di¤er in the measure of economic activity used. The rst
one, named VAR-KM, includes the Kilian measure of global economic activity; and the second, named VAR-
AIP, includes aggregate industrial production. Note that in the case of the DFM we impose sign restrictions
on both measures of real economic activity given that the two of them have been used in VAR analysis of the
oil market.20
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses. The black bold lines denote the median impulse responses from
the estimated DFM and the shaded areas represent the 16th and 84th percentile bootstrapped error bands.
The pink and blue lines represent the median impulse responses and error bands from the VAR-KM, and the
VAR-AIP, respectively. The impulse responses obtained using the DFM are di¤erent both in terms of shape
and magnitude compared to the VARs. In particular, the response of the oil price after a demand shock is
substantially smaller in the DFM than in the VARs. In addition, the response of oil prices is smaller after an oil
inventory demand shock and supply shocks. Although our main focus is on oil prices, there is a sharp contrast
in the response of other variables. For example, the response of both measures of economic activity is higher
and more persistent in the VARs than the DFM for all shocks.
[Figure 1 about here]
The contrast between the two methods is further assessed by analyzing the forecast error variance decom-
position of the oil price presented in Table 2. The Table shows the variance decomposition for the DFM, and
for the 4-variable VARs constructed using the two alternative measures of global economic activity.
The variance decomposition in both VARs is dominated by global demand shocks at all horizons. The oil
inventory demand shock also plays a signicant role, accounting for about 10% to 30% of oil price uctuations.
The sum of the three shocks accounts for around 85% of the oil price variation in both VARs. By contrast, the
variance decomposition from the DFM gives a di¤erent picture. First, the three shocks explain only around
65% of oil price uctuations. Second, the share of oil price uctuations explained by demand forces decreases
signicantly, while the share driven by supply shocks remains largely unchanged. Although global demand
shocks still account for the largest proportion of oil price uctuations, their contribution is smaller compared
to the VARs. The oil inventory demand shock is also signicantly a¤ected, as using the DFM it only explains
between 7% to 19% of the variation in oil prices.
[Table 2 about here]
The comparison between the DFM and the VARs yields a number of interesting results. First, the in-
formation set plays an important role. This is illustrated by the fact that the shape and magnitude of the
impulse responses are signicantly di¤erent. Second, the DFM suggests a smaller role of global demand forces
to explain oil price uctuations. These quantitative di¤erences are relevant given that since Kilian (2009) most
of the recent literature points at demand forces as drivers of the oil price. Third, the variance decomposition
of the DFM contains a large unexplained component. We conjecture that part of this is due to speculation in
the oil market which we incorporate in the next section.
19 Implementing an orthogonality test reifnorces the results from information su¢ ciency test. The shocks identied from a
low-dimensional VAR are not orthogonal to the information of lagged factors. See Appendix C for details.
20The estimated VAR is not directly comparable with Kilian and Murphy (2011a). In particular, the authors use monthly
data, a di¤erent stationarity transformation of the data, and impose additional restrictions. Our objective is not to make a direct
comparison of our results to theirs but to illustrate the potential implications of expanding the VAR information set with factors.
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4.2 Baseline Model: DFM with 4 Shocks
In this section we extend the DFM model with three identied shocks as previously analyzed to include the
speculative shock. We show impulse responses and variance decompositions to evaluate how much of the
variation in oil market variables is accounted for by each of the shocks. We also examine the cumulative e¤ect
of the sequence of historical shocks on the path of the real oil price by looking at the historical decomposition
and analyze the e¤ects of each shock on the comovement between commodity prices.
4.2.1 Impulse responses
Figure 2 presents the median impulse responses (bold lines) of oil production, oil inventories, the real price of
oil, real economic activity, and industrial production to oil supply, oil inventory demand, global demand, and
speculative shocks using a DFM. The gure also shows, for comparison purposes, the impulse responses using
a DFM with 3 shocks (blue lines).
[Figure 2 about here]
Focusing on the estimation of the DFM, a negative oil supply shock is associated with a temporary drop
in production. Oil inventories decrease in an e¤ort to smooth production and this e¤ect is persistent. The
real oil price rises on impact, exhibiting a transitory e¤ect. As production stabilizes, the e¤ect on real oil
prices vanishes. The latter e¤ect is reected in a transitory decline in aggregate industrial production and real
economic activity.
A positive oil inventory demand shock is associated with an immediate jump in the real price of oil. The
real oil price overshoots on impact and declines gradually. The initial increase is reversed within ve quarters.
Inventories exhibit a persistent increase as in Kilian and Murphy (2011a) and oil production increases. The
e¤ects on aggregate industrial production and real economic activity are negative and small.
A positive global demand shock is associated with an increase in aggregate industrial production and real
economic activity. As a consequence of high-demand pressures triggered by rapid growth, real oil prices exhibit
a persistent increase with a peak after two quarters and a very gradual decline. Oil production also rises, but
only temporarily, and oil inventories decline to satisfy the higher demand.
A positive speculative shock is associated with a signicant decline in oil production because producers hold
oil back from the market in anticipation of higher prices in the future. Oil prices show a signicant increase
while inventories accumulate. The e¤ects on real economic activity and industrial production are insignicant,
positive, small and temporary.
By comparing the DFM with 3 and 4 shocks we note that estimating an additional shock does not a¤ect
the shape and magnitude of the impulse responses identied with 3 shocks only.21
4.2.2 The drivers of oil market variables
In this subsection, we assess how much of the variation in oil market variables (oil prices, oil inventories, and
oil production) over the sample is accounted for by each of the shocks analyzed. The variance decomposition
for oil prices is shown in Table 3. The rst point to note is that the results are quite stable with respect to
21 In the online appendix we compare the impulse responses of the 4-variable VARs with 3 and 4 shocks against our DFM baseline
(with 4 shocks) to assess whether the incorporating an additional shock a¤ects the results. Very small di¤erences arise (although
the di¤erences are more pronounced than the ones we observe from comparing the DFM with 3 and 4 shocks). We conclude that the
identication of the additional shock does not severely a¤ect the results in the VARs. However, we emphasize that the di¤erences
between the DFM and the VARs are large, reinforcing the idea that the information set matters for identication.
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the DFM with three shocks shown in Table 2. It is generally suggested that identifying more shocks tends to
narrow the set of valid impulse response functions. However, in our case, identifying an additional shock does
not alter the results, suggesting that we are pinning down the valid set of impulse responses. As before, global
demand shocks are the most important driver of oil prices, accounting for up to 43% of oil price uctuations.
Speculative shocks are the second most important driver, explaining up to 14% of oil price movements. The
oil inventory demand shock is particularly important on impact (10%) and then decreases after 2 quarters and
regains importance at longer horizons. The oil supply shock is the least relevant driver, explaining less than
8% of the variation in oil prices at all horizons.
[Table 3 about here]
Our results conrm Kilians (2009) conclusion that global demand shocks are the main drivers of oil price
uctuations. In addition, we show that speculative shocks are the second most important driver of oil prices.
Given the importance attributed to the modeling of oil inventories (see Kilian and Murphy, 2011a), it is
informative to show their variance decomposition, presented in Table 4. In the short run, 20% of the variation
in oil inventories is driven by oil supply shocks, consistent with production smoothing in response to a supply
shock. Interestingly, oil inventory demand explains up to 12% of inventory uctuations while global demand
shock contributes up to 22% of inventory movements. In turn, speculative shocks explain only 11% of the
uctuations in oil inventories. At longer horizons, the share of global demand declines to 7%, while the share of
oil supply increases to 28%. The explanatory power of oil inventory demand and speculative shocks is similar
to the short-run case. These results suggest that uctuations in oil inventories are due to oil inventory demand
motives as well as production smoothing in response to oil supply shocks. In this way, our ndings are consistent
with those of Kilian and Murphy (2011a).
[Table 4 about here]
Table 5 presents the variance decomposition of oil production. On impact, oil supply shocks explain around
33% of oil production uctuations. The speculative shock a¤ects the incentives faced by producers, who lower
oil production in anticipation of perceived increases in the price of oil. Therefore, it is expected that speculative
shocks would play a role as a driver of oil production. In fact, they explain around 20% of oil production
uctuations. The large e¤ect of speculative shocks on oil production can be attributed to the fact that the
speculative shock resembles a "managed supply" shock in the presence of higher expected prices. By contrast,
the supply shock is a disruption, and therefore, it is large on impact but it slowly reverts. The fact that the
speculative shock accounts for a larger share of the variance decomposition of oil production than oil inventory
demand emphasizes that the channel of adjustment through below ground inventories is playing an important
role. This is not surprising given that holding below ground inventories is generally less costly than holding
above ground inventories.
[Table 5 about here]
4.2.3 Speculation and oil prices in the past decade
In Table 2 we showed how much of the variation in oil prices is explained by each shock. We note here that
this is an average measure for the entire period analyzed and consequently does not provide information on
whether the nancialization of commodity markets in recent years led to an increase in the price of oil. In order
to investigate this possibility, it is instructive to calculate the historical decomposition of the oil price to the 4
shocks identied. Figure 3 presents the results.
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[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 shows that global demand, and therefore real forces, were the main drivers of oil price increases.
We also observe that speculation was responsible for a large proportion of the oil price increase between 2004
and mid-2006. The Figure suggests that speculation contributed around 15% to oil price increases in this
period. It is interesting that the speculative shock begins to play a relevant role as a driver of oil price increases
in 2004, which is when signicant index investment started to ow into commodities markets (see Tang and
Xiong, 2012). This nding conrms that we are picking up the form of speculative shock resulting from the
nancialization of commodity markets. The upward trend in prices due to global demand clearly started before
2004. This could have been a triggering factor to speculative forces given that speculation is likely to rise when
demand is increasing (see Singleton, 2011; and Tang and Xiong, 2012). Another feature of interest is that the
contribution of speculative shocks to oil price increases becomes atter from 2007 until 2008. This highlights
that the gains from speculation decrease as the oil price goes up.22
We note that the period in which speculation plays a key role in oil price uctuations (2004-2006) coincides
with contango in the futures market (as documented, e.g., in Singleton, 2011). During this period the term
structure of oil future contracts has a positive slope, suggesting that prices are expected to be higher. Hamil-
ton (2009b) analyzes the contango and backwardation periods in the oil market and illustrates that in 2008
speculation did not play a role in the oil price increase. Our results are in line with his analysis given that the
contribution of speculative shocks to oil uctuations becomes at in 2008, coincidentally in the period in which
the market enters backwardation.
The V-shaped decline in the real price of oil in late 2008 is driven mainly by the recession associated with
the global nancial crisis, and reected by the global demand shock. However, the speculative shock also played
a signicant role in the V-shaped decline as the nancial crisis hurt the risk appetite of nancial investors for
commodities in their portfolios (see Tang and Xiong, 2012), consequently pushing prices down. Another aspect
to emphasize is that oil inventory demand shocks would have implied basically no uctuations in the oil price
between 2004 and mid-2006. These years are associated with the start of the surge in oil prices.
The historical decomposition also helps to explain the developments in the physical side of the oil market
in the last decade. For example, Hamilton (2009b) observes that the growing demand of the past ten years was
linked to a stagnant supply. Our model suggests that the reason for more stable oil production can be found
in rising expectations of future spot prices, which undermined the incentives of producers to accommodate
demand.
Some observers of the oil market have tended to disregard the idea that speculation played an important
role in the last decade by pointing out that the level of inventories did not rise over this period (see Irwin and
Sanders, 2010). With respect to this, we underline that there are two contrasting forces pushing oil inventories
in opposite directions. On the one hand, the strong increase in global demand over the past decade (coupled
with stagnant supply) would have implied a reduction in the level of stocks. On the other hand, speculative
forces would be accompanied by an increase in inventories. Therefore, it is not surprising that, as a result of
these two e¤ects, oil inventories do not show large changes. Our model o¤ers a consistent explanation of these
developments in the physical side of the market.
22Let us illustrate this claim with a simple example that applies to contango periods like the one observed in 2004-2007. Suppose
that the spot price is 30 USD, the 1 year forward price is 60 USD, the interest rate is 10%, and there are no storage costs. An
investor would borrow 30 USD, buy oil, wait for delivery and sell it for 60 USD. The total cost for the investor is 33, and the
revenue is 27. Now assume that the forward curve shifts upwards, so that the spot price is 100 USD and the forward price is 130
USD. In this case the total cost for the investor is 110 USD, and the revenue is 20 USD.
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The oil market has witnessed substantial changes over the sample period analyzed. It is therefore natural
to ask whether these changes a¤ected the way oil shocks a¤ect the economy. We estimate the DFM for a
subsample starting in 1986 and our results remain robust.23
4.2.4 Comovement in Commodity Prices
One of the advantages of the DFM is that it allows us to include a large number of variables such as the
prices of di¤erent commodities. Therefore, we can assess what is the impact of each shock on the price of other
commodities. This question is of particular importance since it allows us to check whether commodity prices co-
move after a speculative shock, as suggested by Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990). Barberis and Schleifer (2003)
highlight that since index investors typically focus on strategic portfolio allocation between the commodity class
and other asset classes (such as stocks and bonds) they tend to trade in and out of all commodities in a chosen
index at the same time.
Analyzing the response of other commodity prices also allows us to investigate an additional dimension
of the global demand shock. Kilian (2009) interprets this shock as an increase of demand for all industrial
commodities, fueled over the last decade by high growth in China and India (see also Kilian, 2010; and Kilian
and Hicks, 2009). If this is the case, demand for industrial commodities such as copper and aluminium will
rise because these commodities are used as inputs in production. At the same time, demand for nonindustrial
commodities is likely to rise as a result of increases in income. Demand pressures would be associated with an
increase in the price of all commodities.
To illustrate comovement between commodity prices we decompose the correlation between the real oil
price and a commodity portfolio into the contributions of the structural shocks of the DFM following the
methodology by Den Haan and Sterk (2011). Figure 4 shows the correlation between the real oil price and four
portfolios of commodity indexes, calculated as an equal-weighted real price index for each commodity sector,
as well as an aggregate of all of them.24 We obtain three main results. First, the largest correlations are in
response to a global demand shock. In this way, our results are consistent with the view that the commodity
price boom is due to rapid growth of the global economy. Second, the speculative shock is associated with a
positive correlation between oil prices and other commoditiesprices even though this correlation is smaller
than the one given by the global demand shock. Third, the correlations between oil prices and the prices of
other commodities are negative in the case of oil supply and oil inventory demand shocks. This implies that the
oil inventory demand shock cannot be responsible for the comovement in commodity prices. This result shows
that the type of speculative shock that we are capturing seems to be more in line with the type of behavior
that would result from the nancialization of commodity markets. Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) were the
rst to emphasize that comovement in commodity markets can be related to the behavior of speculators who
are long in several commodities at the same time. This is becoming the focus of study of a growing literature in
nance (see Singleton, 2011; and Tang and Xiong, 2012). We note, however, that the correlation in the case of
the speculative shock is smaller than for the global demand shock. This nding is in line with Tang and Xiong
(2012). Overall, there is not a large heterogeneity in the correlations between oil prices and the prices for each
commodity sector.
[Figure 4 about here]
23The results are not presented here to preserve space but are available upon request.
24The four porfolios are: Industrial metals, softs, grains, and precious metals. Industrial metals include copper, aluminium,
nickel, iron ore, and zinc. The soft sector is composed of cotton, tobacco, sugar, co¤ee, and cacao. Grains are sunower oil, palm
oil, soybeans, wheat, rice and maize. Finally, precious metals include gold and silver. See Geman (2005) for a description of these
commodity sectors and the distribution of global supply and demand for each of these commodities.
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5 Conclusion
The increase in oil prices in 2004 coincided with a large ow of investment into commodity markets and an
increased price comovement between di¤erent commodities. One of the objectives of this paper is to analyze
the sources of these price increases and assess whether speculation played a key role in driving this empirical
pattern.
We use a DFM to identify oil shocks from a large dataset, including both macroeconomic and nancial
variables of the G7 countries and a rich set of commodity prices. This method is motivated by showing that
small scale VARs are not informationally su¢ cient to identify the shocks. Therefore, we use a set of factors to
summarize the bulk of aggregate uctuations in our data. We show that the inclusion of a large information set
matters. The DFM model proposed in this paper implies a smaller role for global demand shocks in explaining
uctuations in the real price of oil than VAR estimates.
Consistent with previous studies, we nd that oil prices have been historically driven by the strength of
global demand. However, speculation contributed to the oil price increase between 2004 and 2008. Our analysis
pins down the start of speculative forces driving oil prices to 2004, which is when signicant investment started
to ow into commodity markets. We nd that the decline in the real price of oil in late 2008 is driven mainly by
the negative global demand shock associated with the recession after the nancial crisis. The speculative shock
also played a signicant role in the decline as the nancial crisis eroded the balance sheets of many nancial
institutions, which in turn a¤ected their demand for commodity assets in their portfolio, consequently pushing
prices down.
When we analyze the conditional correlations between oil prices and the prices of other commodities, we
nd that the largest correlations are in response to global demand shocks, consistent with Kilian (2009).
Interestingly, the speculative shock is also associated with a positive comovement between oil prices and prices
of other commodities. This nding is consistent with the results of Tang and Xiong (2012) and further supports
the idea that the speculative shock that we identify is picking up the e¤ects of nancialization driven by the rapid
growth of commodity index investment. The correlation between oil prices and the prices of other commodities
is negative for the other shocks, suggesting that they may not be responsible for the comovement in commodity
prices.
Our results highlight a major challenge faced by policymakers in the medium to long-run: Although spec-
ulation played a signicant role, the high oil prices witnessed in the past decade are mainly due to demand
pressures, which are likely to resurge with the recovery of the world economy.
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Table 1. Sign Restrictions
Shock Oil production Oil inventories Real oil prices Real activitya
Oil supply     +  
Oil inventory demand + + +  
Global demand + + +
Speculative   + +
Notes: All shocks are normalized to imply an increase in the price of oil. Blank entries denote that no sign restriction
is imposed. The sign restrictions are imposed only on impact.
a Sign restrictions for real activity are imposed jointly on aggregate industrial production and the Kilian measure of
economic activity (in the DFM).
Table 2. Variance Decomposition of the Real Oil Price
Horizon Oil Supply Oil Inventory Demand Global Demand
1 VAR-KM 0.0865 0.2850 0.5415
VAR-AIP 0.1171 0.2937 0.4758
DFM 0.0814 0.1943 0.4160
2 VAR-KM 0.0732 0.1997 0.6259
VAR-AIP 0.1162 0.2379 0.5212
DFM 0.0641 0.1245 0.4733
3 VAR-KM 0.0351 0.1623 0.6920
VAR-AIP 0.0784 0.2528 0.5439
DFM 0.0349 0.1002 0.5228
4 VAR-KM 0.0280 0.1361 0.7128
VAR-AIP 0.0655 0.2805 0.5327
DFM 0.0281 0.0848 0.5520
8 VAR-KM 0.0306 0.0687 0.7766
VAR-AIP 0.0868 0.1846 0.5993
DFM 0.0384 0.0702 0.5672
12 VAR-KM 0.0307 0.0837 0.7613
VAR-AIP 0.0879 0.2019 0.5814
DFM 0.0477 0.1072 0.5354
Notes: VAR-KM denotes that the VAR was estimated using the Kilian measure of real economic
activity. VAR-AIP denotes that the VAR was estimated using aggregate industrial production.
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Table 3. Variance Decomposition of the Real Oil Price (DFM)
Horizon Oil Supply Oil Inventory Demand Global Demand Speculative
1 0.0737 0.0944 0.3208 0.1158
2 0.0532 0.0410 0.3492 0.1441
3 0.0338 0.0293 0.3867 0.1383
4 0.0276 0.0266 0.4290 0.1153
8 0.0539 0.0595 0.4037 0.0622
12 0.0723 0.1155 0.3496 0.0627
Table 4. Variance Decomposition of Oil Inventories (DFM)
Horizon Oil Supply Oil Inventory Demand Global Demand Speculative
1 0.1971 0.1375 0.1568 0.0993
2 0.1971 0.1344 0.1681 0.0893
3 0.1430 0.1976 0.1432 0.1052
4 0.1855 0.2241 0.1107 0.1092
8 0.3553 0.0506 0.1685 0.0941
12 0.2831 0.1955 0.0660 0.0539
Table 5. Variance Decomposition of Oil Production (DFM)
Horizon Oil Supply Oil Inventory Demand Global Demand Speculative
1 0.3269 0.0036 0.0117 0.1929
2 0.0836 0.0617 0.2053 0.1989
3 0.0855 0.0805 0.1852 0.1702
4 0.0835 0.0632 0.1981 0.1852
8 0.1827 0.1357 0.1109 0.1621
12 0.2352 0.1587 0.0943 0.1349
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Figure 1. Impulse Responses: VARs and DFM (3 shocks)
Notes: The gure shows the impulse responses to oil supply, oil inventory demand, and global demand
shocks using a DFM and VAR with sign restrictions. The black bold lines denote the median impulse
responses from the DFM and the shaded areas represent the 16th and 84th percentile bootstrapped error
bands. The pink lines represent the median impulse responses and 16th and 84th percentile bootstrapped
error bands from the VAR-KM. The blue lines are the impulse responses and 16th and 84th percentile
bootstrapped error bands for the VAR-AIP.
22
Figure 2. Impulse Responses: DFM
Notes: The gure shows the impulse responses to oil supply, oil inventory demand, global demand, and
speculative shocks using a DFM with sign restrictions. The black bold lines denote the median impulse
responses from the DFM and the shaded areas represent the 16th and 84th percentile bootstrapped error
bands. The blue lines represent the median impulse responses and 16th and 84th percentile bootstrapped
error bands for the DFM with 3 shocks (oil supply, oil inventory demand, and global demand shocks).
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Figure 3. Historical Decomposition of the Oil Price for the Last Decade
24
Figure 4. Conditional Correlations
Notes: The gure shows the correlation of the real oil price with di¤erent portfolios of commodity
indexes, calculated as an equal-weighted real price index for each commodity sector. The sectors are:
industrial metals, softs, grains, and precious metals. Industrial metals include copper, aluminium, nickel,
iron ore, and zinc; softs are composed of cotton, tobacco, sugar, co¤ee, and cacao; grains are sunower oil,

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B: A Simplied Model of the Oil Market
This appendix presents a very stylized model of the oil market that provides insights about the propa-
gation of the shocks identied in our paper.
The Demand for Oil
In what follows we summarize the main equations that determine the demand for oil. Detailed derivations
can be found in Hamilton (2009a). The demand for oil originates from the demand of gasoline retailers.
In fact, oil (Xt) is used as an intermediate input for the production of gasoline, whose real price is Gt:
F (Xt; It) is the production function and depends on the current level of inventories, It.1 The rst order
conditions of the retailersproblem are:




Pt + C0 (It+1) =
Gt+1F
0
I (Xt+1; It+1) + Pt+1
1 + rt
: (B2)
Equation (B1) is the optimal demand schedule for crude oil by gasoline retailers. It states that the marginal
productivity of oil has to be equal to the relative price (with respect to gasoline). This is nothing more than
the usual result that under perfect competition marginal productivity is equal to marginal costs. Equation
(B2) is implied by optimal inventory management. It follows that if rms buy one more unit of oil today
to store as inventory, incurring a (marginal) cost of Pt + C0 (It+1) ; this will lower next periods cost by
Gt+1F
0
I (Xt+1; It+1) + Pt+1.
Therefore, current oil production is either consumed for the production of gasoline or stored as inventories
(for future production of gasoline). This implies that mismatches between time-t production (Qt) and
consumption (Xt) of oil are reected in changes in the stock of inventories:
It+1 = Qt  Xt: (B3)
To close the model we assume the following demand for gasoline2




where t is capturing the systematic (inelastic) demand for gasoline, as well as a random component that
can be interpreted as an aggregate demand shock.







F 0X (Xt; It) : (B5)
Note that (for  > 0) this is downward sloping, with crude oil prices inversely related to total crude
consumed in the same period. In addition, this relation depends also on the current stock of inventories.




I (Xt+1; It+1) + Pt+1
1 + rt
  C0 (It+1) ;
therefore implying a downward sloping demand, where It+1 = DInv (Pt; Pt+1; Gt+1; Xt+1; rt) ; and Pt+1
acts as a forward shifter of the curve (i.e. D0
Inv;Pt+1
> 0). Similarly, (B5) also implies a downward sloping
demand curve, Xt = DCons (Pt; t; It) ; however this does not depend on the future price level.
1 Including inventories as a state variable in the production function is a short-cut to produce positive convenience yields
and therefore positive holding of inventories in every period.
2The demand for gasoline can be easily derived from a utility maximization where gasoline is a nal good that produces
utility to the households (see, e.g., Nakov and Nuno, 2011).
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The total demand function for oil can be found substituting (B5) and (B2) into (B3), which gives the
following relation:
Qt = DInv (Pt; Pt+1; Gt+1; Xt+1; rt)  It +DCons (Pt; t; It) : (B6)
This shows that a change in the future oil price leads to a shift in demand, through an increase in the
demand for inventories (Hamilton, 2009a; and Kilian and Murphy, 2011a).3
Modeling Oil Extraction
In this section we discuss the producer problem and derive optimal oil extraction.4
Denote with Qt the production or extraction of oil in period t, and dene with Qt the cumulative
extraction at the end of period t, so that: Qt =
Pt
=0Q : Let <t be the amount of proven reserves so that
the total amount of the resources exploitable at time t is Rt = <t   Qt.5 Consider a typical competitive
owner of an exhaustible resource who can obtain the market price, Pt, for the resource at time t. Her
optimal extraction prole, fQ ; RgT=t, is obtained by maximizing the discounted stream of prots over





s=t (1 + rs)
[PQ   C (Q ;Q )] ; (B7)
given the resource constraint
Rt = Rt 1  Qt + et; (B8)
where et = <t <t 1 allows for the possibility that the total amount of proven reserves may vary over time,
either due to data revisions or because of new resource discoveries. In this way, et can be considered as an
exogenous supply shock.
Following Farzin (1992), the total extraction cost at time t is given by a twice continuously di¤erentiable
function Ct = C (Qt;Qt). It follows that the total extraction cost increases both with the current extraction
rate (i.e., C 0Q > 0) and the cumulative extraction up to date (i.e., C
0
Q > 0).
6 In view of geological and
engineering knowledge about exploitation of depletable resources, one expects the marginal extraction cost
C 0Q to have the following properties: (i) diminishing returns to extraction rate that cause the marginal
extraction cost to rise as the extraction rate increases (C 00QQ > 0); (ii) depletion e¤ect that raises the
marginal cost of maintaining a given rate of extraction as increasing amounts of resource are depleted
(C 00QQ > 0). It is also usually postulated that the incremental cost due to cumulative extraction rises not
only with the extraction rate (C 00QQ > 0), but also with the amount already extracted (C
00
QQ > 0) (see, e.g.,
Pindyck 1978).
The rst order conditions for the above optimization problem imply
 t = Pt   C 0Q (Qt;Qt) ;
and




3The demand function (B6) also illustrates propagation of other shocks. In fact, a global demand shock incorporated into
t implies an upward shift of the demand curve (specically, a shift of current consumption DCons). Moreover, any shift of
the convenience yield, such as the one modelled in Alquist and Kilian (2010), also implies an increase in total demand (this
would be the precautionary demand for oil and will a¤ect DInv). These shocks do not imply a contemporaneous shift of the
supply curve, as it will be clear in the next section.
4 In this Appendix we refer to marginal changes in production for current wells in operation. Modeling the investment
decision of developing a new well is out of the scope of the current paper, and it is likely to depend on medium to long run
expectations of the oil price, which are longer than the typical length of a futures contract.
5Dating proven reserves at time t allows for the possibility that its total amount may vary over time, either due to data
revisions or because of new resource discoveries.
6For example, abstracting from technology developments, Favero and Pesaran (1994) show that an extraction cost function
quadratic in the rate of extraction (Qt) and linear in the level of remaining reserves (<t  Rt), with the latter term capturing
the importance of pressure dynamics in the determination of extraction costs [C (Qt; Rt) = A2 Q
2
t + B (<t  Rt)], is the
best-performing specication using North Sea data.
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The Lagrange multiplier t (< 0) is the shadow cost associated with the cumulative extraction up to t. In
equilibrium, it has to be equal to the discounted sum of the incremental costs that an additional unit of
resource extracted at time t brings about in that period and also spills over into all future periods by raising




C 0Q (Q ;Q )Q
s=t (1 + rs)
:
Eliminating the multiplier yields
Pt   C 0Q (Qt;Qt)  C 0Q (Qt;Qt) =
Pt+1   C 0Q (Qt+1;Qt+1)
1 + rt
; (B9)
which is the optimality condition for the extraction rate, i.e. the condition required for optimal below
ground-inventory management. Note that if C 0Q = 0, then the relation above is the Hotelling Principle: The
price of the resource net of marginal extraction cost is expected to rise with the discount rate, r.
Clearly, if the rm were to face an increase in price (Pt+1 > Pt), with all other prices remaining constant,
it would respond by decreasing the amount of current production, until the condition given in equation (B9)
was restored.7
The Impact E¤ect of a Speculative Shock
The equilibrium is given by the intersection of the demand function, (B6), with the supply function,
(B9). We can think of a speculative shock as an unexpected increase in future prices, Pt+1, with respect
to current prices, Pt, where this may result from tradersactivity. If the retailers were to face an increase
in price (Pt+1 > Pt), with all other prices remaining constant, the demand for inventory would increase (as
B2 suggests), resulting in an upward shift of the demand curve. The increase in the demand for inventories
will create pressure to increase production, which is the standard e¤ect of shift in demand along an upward
sloping supply curve. This case, depicted in Figure B1, represents what we refer to as the oil inventory
demand shock.8
At the same time, if oil producers were to be misled by the increase in prices, it would clearly be optimal
response for them to hold production underground to increase it in the future. Facing an increase in price
(Pt+1 > Pt), with all other prices remaining constant, the supply curve shifts left, as producers respond
by decreasing the amount of current production until the condition given in equation (B9) is restored. A
priori it is not clear whether the impact on oil production is positive or negative. This will depend on the
relative shift of the demand and supply curves, as well as the elasticities. In fact, the e¤ect of the supply
shift should dominate the e¤ect of a demand shift (for the sign of production) whenever the supply curve
is very steep.9 Clearly, opposite movements of demand and supply will, in any case, imply a large jump
in the current oil price. Figure B2 plots the speculative shock and shows the case when the response of
production is dominated by the incentives of producers to increase future revenues, as opposed to current
revenues.
In the paper we have assumed that the speculative shock is associated with a decrease in production.
As we discussed, this is actually not clear a priori, and that is the reason why we take this case as a
"conjecture" by Hamilton (2009a). The model helps us understand what conditions are necessary for this
7The optimal supply schedule also shows that a decrease in et (an unexpected decrease in total available/exploitable
reserves), which could be caused by a war, will increase the current marginal costs and therefore shift supply down.
8This is the case considered in Kilian and Murphy (2011a). However, we emphasize that a similar picture would emerge as
a result of a precautionary demand shock such as the one considered in Alquist and Kilian (2010), and also as a result of an
expected shortfall in production (see B2 and B6).
9This would be true in the extreme case of a vertical supply.
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conguration to happen. However, it could be the case that part of the speculative component is captured
by the oil inventory demand shock (as in Kilian and Murphy, 2011a). The fact that the implied path of
the speculative shock moves in line with anecdotal evidence on the role of speculation in the past decade
(in terms of timing, for instance) builds our condence that the speculation shock is in fact capturing the
e¤ect of exogenous shifts in expectations of futures prices. The fact that oil inventory demand captures
shifts in prices around well known episodes of increased uncertainty (such as the Iranian Revolution or the
rst Persian Gulf war) suggests that this shock is dominated by the precautionary demand motive (i.e., a
shift in demand not counteracted enough by a downward shift of supply, see Kilian and Murphy, 2011a).
Figure B1. Oil Inventory Demand Shock Figure B2. Speculative Shock
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Appendix C: Su¢ cient Information and the Choice of Factors
We use the procedure introduced by Giannone and Reichlin (2006) and described in Forni and Gambetti
(2011) to test whether the small-scale VAR is informationally su¢ cient to identify the shocks. The method
uses the Gelper and Croux (2007) multivariate extension of the out-of-sample Granger causality test. We
set the maximum number of factors to be r = 6 and extract the corresponding 6 factors.1 Then, we test
whether the factors Granger-cause the variables of the VAR. If the null of no Granger causality is not
rejected for any of the successive combinations of the factors, the variables of the VAR are informationally
su¢ cient. Otherwise, information su¢ ciency is rejected and the set of variables under consideration does
not contain enough information to estimate the structural shocks. In this case at least one factor should
be added to the estimation. We proceed by augmenting the VAR with an additional factor and repeat the
process until the alternative hypothesis is always rejected for any number of the remaining factors up to
the specied maximum number of factors.
Table C1 reports the (bootstrapped) p-values of the Granger causality test for the VAR and VAR
augmented with the factors. Two measures of global economic activity have been used in the literature.
Therefore, we consider two variants of a 4-variable VAR, which include oil production, oil inventories, the
real oil price, and a proxy for real economic activity. The rst column presents the p-value for the null
that the rst six factors do not Granger-cause the variables of the VAR. Overall, we nd that the variables
of the VAR are Granger-caused by the rst six factors. This implies that the VAR is not informationally
su¢ cient and motivates the use of a DFM to identify the shocks. Since the null is rejected, we proceed by
augmenting the VAR with factors until we fail to reject the null. In the VAR-AIP, we are not able to reject
the informational su¢ ciency of the DFM once 3 factors are added to the baseline VAR. By contrast, in the
VAR-KM, we are not able to reject the informational su¢ ciency of the DFM once 5 factors are added to the
baseline VAR. To reach a balance between the two specications, our model includes 4 factors. However,
our results are robust to the estimation of the DFM with 3 or 5 factors.
Despite the rejection of the informational su¢ ciency of the VAR, some shocks could still be correctly
identied from the low-dimensional VAR. This is true whenever the identied structural shocks from the
VAR are orthogonal to any available information at time t (for example, lagged values of the factors). Oth-
erwise, the identied shock cannot be considered structural (Forni and Gambetti, 2011). In this subsection
we further investigate the role played by the information set by implementing an orthogonality test for each
of the shocks.
Given that the identication by sign restrictions does not identify a single model, we investigate the
orthogonality of the shocks over all sets of identied impulse responses. Table C2 shows the percentage of
rejections of the F -test of orthogonality for each of the shocks identied from the VARs with sign restrictions.
For each possible set of shocks we rst test whether they are Granger-caused by lagged factors. We then
report the number of rejected shocks (at the 10% level) over the total identied shocks.
The results for the VAR-AIP suggest that a linear combination of 4 factors Granger-causes 92% of all
the identied oil supply shocks, 97% of all the identied oil inventory demand shocks, and 95% of all the
identied global demand shocks. Similarly, results for the VAR-KM show that a linear combination of
4 factors Granger-causes 91% of all the identied supply shocks, 69% of all oil inventory demand shocks
and 48% of all identied global demand shocks. These results reinforce the results obtained using the
information su¢ ciency test: The shocks identied from a low-dimensional VAR are not orthogonal to the
information of lagged factors and as a consequence their inuence can be overstated. Overall, these results
highlight the importance of augmenting a low-dimensional VAR with a set of factors.
1The factors are extracted from model (1)-(3) assuming that there are no measurement errors in (2). The results would
be qualitatively similar if we had performmed the test using the rst 6 principal components in the data, or including a
measurement error in (2).
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Table C1. Test for Su¢ cient Information
VAR VAR+1F VAR+2F VAR+3F VAR+4F VAR+5F
VAR-AIP
1F 0.0200     
2F 0.0000 0.4500    
3F 0.0000 0.2600 1.0000   
4F 0.0000 0.0200 0.4733 0.9133  
5F 0.0000 0.0333 0.2633 0.6500 1.0000 
6F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1533 0.9700 1.0000
VAR-KM
1F 0.0133     
2F 0.1367 0.2767    
3F 0.0167 0.3333 0.7433   
4F 0.0100 0.0133 0.4400 0.9867  
5F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 0.0100 
6F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9933
Notes: Bootstrapped p-values of the Granger causality test for the VAR and VAR augmented with
factors. AIP-VAR denotes that the VAR was estimated using aggregate industrial production.
KM-VAR denotes that the VAR was estimated using the Kilian measure of real economic activity.
Table C2. Orthogonality Test
Oil supply Oil inventory demand Global demand
VAR-AIP
4 Factors 0.9240 0.9700 0.9510
VAR-KM
4 Factors 0.9110 0.6980 0.4800
Notes: Percentage of rejection of the F-test of orthogonality (at the 10% level) for each of the shocks
identied from the VAR with sign restrictions. VAR-AIP denotes that the VAR was estimated using
aggregate industrial production. VAR-KM denotes that the VAR was estimated using the Kilian
measure of real economic activity.
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